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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature Of The Case 
 
 The State of Idaho appeals from the district court’s order granting suppression.  The 
state challenges the district court’s determination that a parolee has the same expectation 
of privacy as a non-parolee in an encounter with an officer if the officer is unaware of the 
defendant’s parole status.  The state also challenges the ruling that frisking a person for 
weapons where that person is present at the scene of a suspected shooting, and the gun used 
in the shooting is still believed to be at that scene, is not reasonable. 
 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
 
 Officers Trent Schneider and Joe Martinez responded to a report of a shooting at 
an apartment where intoxicated people, other than the person shot, were still present and 
the whereabouts of the gun used in the shooting was unknown.  (Tr., p. 14, L. 24 – p. 15, 
L. 18; p. 19, Ls. 5-16.)  As officers approached the front of the apartment a man, later 
identified as Isaac Lyle Saldivar, walked from around the back of the apartment.  (Tr., p. 
15, Ls. 22-25.)  Because of the circumstances, the officers detained Saldivar and frisked 
him.  (Tr., p. 15, L. 25 – p. 16, L. 24.)  They found a stolen handgun in his left front pants 
pocket.  (R., p. 54.) Officers arrested Saldivar, ran a warrant check and, upon learning of 
an outstanding arrest warrant, arrested him.  (Tr., p. 16, L. 25 – p. 18, L. 19.)  The gun in 
Saldivar’s pocket was the only gun the officers found at the scene of the shooting.  (R., p. 
54.) 
 Saldivar was also at that time on parole.  (Tr., p. 28, L. 10 – p. 29, L. 12; State’s 
Exhibit 1.)  As part of his parole agreement Saldivar consented to searches of his person 
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and waived his “rights under the Fourth Amendment and the Idaho constitution concerning 
searches.”  (State’s Exhibit 1.)   
 The state charged Saldivar with unlawful possession of a firearm.  (R., pp. 29-30.)  
Saldivar filed a motion to suppress, claiming that he was illegally seized and improperly 
subjected to a frisk search.  (R., pp. 49-52, 108-11.)  The state objected to the motion, 
asserting that as a parolee Saldivar did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy; that 
the stop and frisk were lawful; and that suppression was not an appropriate remedy because 
of inevitable discovery.  (R., pp. 71-87, 98-106.)   
 The district court granted the motion, finding that Saldivar was improperly frisked, 
that he had a right to privacy despite his parole waiver because officers were unaware of 
the waiver, and that the inevitable discovery doctrine was not applicable because the arrest 
on an arrest warrant (which would have revealed the gun in a search incident to arrest) was 
not part of a different investigation.  (R., pp. 114-23.)  The state filed a notice of appeal 







1. Did the district court err by concluding that Saldivar retained a privacy right despite 
his parole status and waiver of his rights against police searches? 
 
2. Did the district court err by concluding that the frisk of Saldivar was unreasonable 
despite his presence at the scene of a shooting where officers believed a gun was still 
present? 
 
3. Did the district court err by requiring an “additional line of inquiry” before the 







The District Court Erred By Concluding That Saldivar Retained A Privacy Right Despite 




 As a condition of parole, Saldivar waived his rights and agreed to submit to searches 
of his person by law enforcement.  (State’s Exhibit 1.)  The district court held that this 
waiver of rights was only effective where law enforcement officers were aware of it, and 
therefore Saldivar demonstrated that he had a privacy right infringed by the frisk search 
conducted by the officers.  (R., pp. 120-21.)  This holding is incompatible with the 
precedents of the Supreme Court of the United States and the Supreme Court of Idaho.   
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
 This Court reviews suppression motion orders with a bifurcated standard.  State v. 
Wulff, 157 Idaho 416, 418, 337 P.3d 575, 577 (2014).  When a decision on a motion to 
suppress is challenged, the appellate court accepts the trial court’s findings of fact that are 
not clearly erroneous, but freely reviews the application of constitutional principles to those 
facts.  Id. 
 
C. The District Court Erred By Applying An Incorrect Legal Standard 
 
Constitutional protections against unreasonable searches and seizures “apply only 
to a person’s reasonable expectation of privacy—one which the party subjectively held and 
which society is willing to recognize as reasonable.”  State v. Ashworth, 148 Idaho 700, 
702, 228 P.3d 381, 383 (Ct. App. 2010).  “A person challenging a search has the burden of 
showing that he or she had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the item or place 
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searched.”  State v. Pruss, 145 Idaho 623, 626, 181 P.3d 1231, 1234 (2008) (citing 
Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 104 (1980)).   
Whether protections against unreasonable searches and seizures apply “involves a 
two-part inquiry: (1) Did the person have a subjective expectation of privacy in the object 
of the challenged search? and (2) Is society willing to recognize that expectation as 
reasonable?”  Id. at 626, 181 P.3d at 1234.  See also Ashworth, 148 Idaho at 702, 228 P.3d 
at 383 (“Therefore, a Fourth Amendment analysis involves a determination of whether the 
defendant had an actual, subjective expectation of privacy and, if so, whether the 
defendant’s expectation of privacy, when viewed objectively, was reasonable under the 
circumstances.”); State v. Fancher, 145 Idaho 832, 837, 186 P.3d 688, 693 (Ct. App. 2008) 
(“An expectation of privacy is objectively reasonable when it is legitimate, justifiable, and 
one society should both recognize and protect.”).  “The burden is on the defendant to prove 
the existence of a legitimate expectation of privacy.”  State v. Spencer, 139 Idaho 736, 739, 
85 P.3d 1135, 1138 (Ct. App. 2004). 
“Idaho appellate courts have long-recognized that parolees and probationers have 
a diminished expectation of privacy and will enforce Fourth Amendment waivers as a 
condition of parole or probation.”  State v. Cruz, 144 Idaho 906, 908, 174 P.3d 876, 878 
(Ct. App. 2007).  See also Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843 (2006); United States v. 
Knights, 534 U.S. 112 (2001).  “[P]ersons conditionally released to societies have a 
reduced expectation of privacy, thereby rendering intrusions by government authorities 
‘reasonable’ which otherwise would be unreasonable or invalid under traditional 





(1987).  Thus, “the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit a police officer from conducting 
a suspicionless search of a parolee.”  Samson, 547 U.S. at 856. 
Application of these standards shows Saldivar did not have a subjectively held 
privacy right that society would recognize as reasonable.  Saldivar did not testify that he 
believed he had a right to be free of a frisk search by officers who were unaware of his 
parole status.  If he had so testified there is no reason such a belief would be considered 
reasonable.  The waiver he signed certainly makes no provision for officer knowledge, nor 
does it indicate that waived rights are restored if an officer is unaware of the waiver.  
(State’s Exhibit 1.)  That Saldivar in fact subjectively and reasonably believed he had a 
right to not be searched after he affirmatively waived his right to not be searched is not 
shown on this record.  Saldivar failed to prove he had an expectation of privacy, and 
therefore failed to demonstrate that the Fourth Amendment even applied in this case. 
The district court did not apply the standards articulated by the Supreme Court of 
the United States and the appellate courts of the State of Idaho.  (R., pp. 120-21.)  Rather, 
it applied Ninth Circuit and Maryland precedent.  (Id. (citing cases).)  The authority relied 
on by the district court is incompatible with the standards articulated by the Supreme and 
the Idaho courts. 
In Moreno v. Baca, 431 F.3d 633 (9th Cir. 2005) (cited at R., p. 120), the Ninth 
Circuit addressed whether Moreno, a parolee, had “‘standing’” to challenge the seizure and 
search of his person.  Id. at 640-41.  The court concluded that cases addressing “‘standing’” 
addressed a “question as to whether the person challenging the search had standing because 
he or she lacked a legitimate expectation of privacy in the place searched or the thing 
seized.”  Id. at 640.  “By contrast there is no question that Moreno had standing to challenge 
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the search and seizure of his own person.”  Id. at 641.  The court’s holding that a parolee 
enjoys the same expectation of privacy against search or seizure of his person as that of a 
non-parolee is contrary to the above-cited authority of the Supreme Court of the United 
States and the Idaho appellate courts. 
In Samson, 547 U.S. at 846 (decided a year after Moreno), the officer stopped and 
searched Samson’s person.  The Court held that “the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit 
a police officer from conducting a suspicionless search of a parolee.”  Id. at 857.  In State 
v. Purdum, 147 Idaho 206, 208-10, 207 P.3d 182, 184-86 (2009), a probation condition 
that Purdum submit to warrantless and suspicionless BAC testing meant the officer 
properly seized and searched Purdum’s person.  The analysis of Moreno, that a parolee has 
the same privacy rights in his person as a non-parolee, is directly contrary to precedent. 
The reasoning of the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland is similarly flawed.  
That court reasoned that “a constitutionally defective search cannot be justified after the 
fact by information unknown to the officer at the time of the warrantless search.”  State v. 
Donaldson, 108 A.3d 500, 506 (Md. App. 2015).  The state’s position in this case is not 
(nor has it ever been) that the search was “justified” by the parole waiver.  Indeed, the state 
stipulates (for purposes of this argument only) that the search and seizure were not 
“justified” by reasonable suspicion.  The state’s only position is that Saldivar did not have 
a subjective expectation of privacy that society would recognize as reasonable, and 
therefore could not assert that the rights he specifically waived had been violated even if 
the officer’s conduct did not otherwise meet Fourth Amendment standards. 
Saldivar had the burden of establishing that his “‘own protection was infringed by 
the search and seizure.’”  Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 138 (1978) (quoting Simmons v. 
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United States, 390 U.S. 377, 389 (1968)).  See also Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 88 
(1998) (“[I]n order to claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment, a defendant must 
demonstrate that he personally has an expectation of privacy in the place searched, and that 
his expectation is reasonable; i.e., one that has a source outside of the Fourth Amendment, 
either by reference to concepts of real or personal property law or to understandings that 
are recognized and permitted by society.” (internal quotation omitted)); State v. Bordeaux, 
148 Idaho 1, 9, 217 P.3d 1, 9 (Ct. App. 2009) (“The rule is well established that in order to 
assert standing to suppress evidence, the individual seeking suppression must demonstrate 
some proprietary interest in the premises searched or some other interest giving a 
reasonable expectation of privacy.”); State v. Foldesi, 131 Idaho 778, 780, 963 P.2d 1215, 
1217 (Ct. App. 1998) (“Since an illegal search violates the rights only of those who have 
a legitimate expectation of privacy in the place or property searched, only those with such 
a privacy interest may obtain suppression of the fruits of the search.” (emphasis added)).  
This is because “Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights” that “may not be 
vicariously asserted.”  Rakas, 439 U.S. at 133-34 (internal quotations omitted).  “A person 
who is aggrieved by an illegal search and seizure only through the introduction of 
damaging evidence secured by a search of a third person’s premises or property has not 
had any of his Fourth Amendment rights infringed.”  Id. at 134 (emphasis added).  See also 
United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 731 (1980) (“a court may not exclude evidence 
under the Fourth Amendment unless it finds that an unlawful search or seizure violated the 
defendant’s own constitutional rights”).  Thus, even if an illegal search were established, 
the exclusionary rule applies only to “defendants whose Fourth Amendment rights have 
been violated.”  Rakas, 439 U.S. at 134.  See also Byrd v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 138 
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S. Ct. 1518, 1530 (2018) (“a person must have a cognizable Fourth Amendment interest in 
the place searched before seeking relief for an unconstitutional search”).  Simply put, the 
defendant “bears the burden of proving” that “he had a legitimate expectation of privacy” 
infringed by the illegal search.  Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 104 (1980) (holding 
there was no expectation of privacy in a companion’s purse).  The question is not whether 
the search was improper, but “whether governmental officials violated any legitimate 
expectation of privacy held by petitioner.”  Id. at 106.  Regardless of the constitutionality 
of the challenged search, a “defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights are violated only when 
the challenged conduct invaded his legitimate expectation of privacy.”  United States v. 
Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 731 (1980) (emphasis original). 
Under this well-established rubric, a decision that the movant seeking suppression 
lacks a privacy interest infringed by the governmental action ends the inquiry without 
regard for whether the challenged search or seizure was otherwise justified.  Thus, in 
Carter, 525 U.S. at 91, the Supreme Court concluded because “respondents had no 
legitimate expectation of privacy” in the place they alleged was improperly searched, it 
need not reach the question of whether there had even been a search.  In Gawron, 112 Idaho 
at 843, 736 P.2d at 1297, the Idaho Supreme Court acknowledged that the search “may 
well have exceeded the permissible limits” of a constitutional search, but that did not matter 
because it was within the scope of Gawron’s Fourth Amendment waiver as a condition of 
probation.  See also Purdum, 147 Idaho at 210, 207 P.3d at 186 (probation term allowing 
random blood or breath tests “at any time and at any place by any law enforcement officer” 
allowed search and seizure to conduct random blood and breath tests).  Whether the search 
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at issue in this case was otherwise constitutionally justified is simply irrelevant if Saldivar’s 
reasonable expectation of privacy was not infringed. 
It was not.  “[T]he touchstone of [Fourth] Amendment analysis has been the 
question whether a person has a constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of 
privacy.”  Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 177 (1984) (internal quotation omitted).  
Saldivar’s waiver of his Fourth Amendment rights extinguished his expectation of privacy.  
Gawron, 112 Idaho at 843, 736 P.2d at 1297.  The Supreme Court of the United States has 
held, “the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit a police officer from conducting a 
suspicionless search of a parolee.”  Samson, 547 U.S. at 857.  The district court’s holding 
that the officer’s ignorance of Saldivar’s parole status and waiver restored Saldivar’s 
privacy expectation to the same as a non-parolee who had not waived his Fourth 
Amendment rights is without basis.  Indeed, bestowing a privacy interest on every 
individual unless the officers know that no privacy interest exists would confer almost 
limitless privacy interests, and completely eviscerate the two-step analysis set forth by 
controlling precedent.  The district court erred by adding a requirement of officer 
knowledge to the expectation of privacy inquiry. 
Saldivar failed to establish that he had an expectation of privacy infringed by his 
detention and frisk for weapons.  He therefore failed to show that any of the evidence the 
state acquired in this case was obtained by an unlawful search or seizure.  The district 
court’s conclusion that the evidence should be suppressed anyway because Officer 
Schneider could not have realized his actions were lawful is without legal or logical basis.  
Because Saldivar’s rights were not violated, he was not entitled to suppression.  The district 








 The district court concluded that officers lacked sufficient justification to frisk 
Saldivar for weapons.  (R., pp. 117-120.1)  In doing so the district court concluded that the 
nature of the possible crime and presence of a gun at the scene were not enough, without 
more, to justify a frisk for weapons.  It is well-established, however, that the nature of the 
crime can be a determinative factor in justifying a frisk.  Add in reason to believe that a 
gun was present and the officer had reasonable suspicion Saldivar could be armed and 
dangerous.  Because the district court employed an erroneous legal standard, it committed 
reversible error. 
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
 This Court reviews a district court’s order resolving a motion to suppress “using a 
bifurcated standard of review.”  State v. Huffaker, 160 Idaho 400, 404, 374 P.3d 563, 567 
(2016).  “This Court accepts the trial court’s findings of fact unless they are clearly 
                                            
1 The district court’s factual findings include one finding that may be clearly erroneous, 
depending on how it is interpreted.  The district court stated there was no evidence that 
Officer Schneider considered Saldivar to be dangerous, and that the evidence showed the 
officer patted down Saldivar because of standard operating procedure.  (R., p. 115.)  Officer 
Schneider did testify that he conducted the frisk because it is standard operating procedure 
to frisk anyone they place in handcuffs, but that he undertook these safety measures of 
cuffing and frisking for “[o]fficer safety reasons only” and was concerned for officer safety 
because “there was a gun involved.”  (Tr., p. 16, Ls. 5-21.)  Because the cuffing was not 
standard procedure, but initiated based on officer safety concerns, the evidence establishes 
that the safety precautions of cuffing, followed by frisking, were both undertaken because 
of safety concerns arising from the recent use of a gun in a shooting.  The evidence 
establishes that Officer Schneider cuffed and frisked Saldivar based upon safety concerns 
arising exclusively from the fact of the presence of a gun, recently used in a shooting, at 
the apartment, and not from any fact particular to Saldivar. 
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erroneous, but may freely review the trial court’s application of constitutional principles in 
light of those facts.”  Id. 
 
C. The Frisk For Possible Weapons Was Reasonable Because Saldivar Was Present 
At The Scene Of A Shooting Where A Gun Was Believed To Still Be  
 
 An officer may, consistent with the Fourth Amendment, “conduct a limited self-
protective pat down search of a detainee in order to remove any weapons.”  State v. Henage, 
143 Idaho 655, 660, 152 P.3d 16, 21 (2007) (citing State v. Wright, 134 Idaho 79, 82, 996 
P.2d 298, 301 (2000)).  Such searches are “evaluated in light of the facts known to the 
officers on the scene and the inference of the risk of danger reasonably drawn from the 
totality of the circumstances.”  Henage, 143 Idaho at 660, 152 P.3d at 21 (quotations and 
citation omitted).  The ultimate inquiry is an objective one, which requires the court to 
consider whether the facts available to the officer would “warrant a man of reasonable 
caution in the belief that the action taken was appropriate.”  Id. (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 
U.S. 1, 22 (1968)).  Such protective searches are allowed in situations where a “danger may 
arise from the possible presence of weapons in the area surrounding a suspect.”  Michigan 
v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049 (1983). 
 The Idaho Supreme Court has further held that “[a] person can be armed without 
posing a risk of danger,” such that the mere knowledge that an individual has a weapon is 
insufficient to justify a frisk; there must also be a basis for concluding the armed individual 
is dangerous.  Henage, 143 Idaho at 660, 152 P.3d at 21.  “Several factors influence whether 
a reasonable person in the officer’s position would conclude that a particular person was 
armed and dangerous.”  State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 819, 203 P.3d 1203, 1218 (2009).  
The factors include whether:  (1) “there were any bulges in the suspect’s clothing that 
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resembled a weapon”; (2) “the encounter took place at night or in a high crime area”; (3) 
“the individual made threatening or furtive movements”; (4) “the individual indicated that 
he or she possessed a weapon”; (5) “the individual appeared to be under the influence of 
alcohol or illegal drugs”; (6) the individual “was unwilling to cooperate”; and (7) the 
individual “had a reputation for dangerousness.”  Id. (citations omitted).  This list is neither 
exclusive nor exhaustive, however, because the “test is an objective one that asks whether, 
under the totality of the circumstances, a reasonably prudent person would be justified in 
concluding that the individual posed a risk of danger.”  Id. at 818, 203 P.3d at 1217.  
“Whether any of these circumstances, taken together or by themselves, are enough to 
justify a Terry frisk depends on an analysis of the totality of the circumstances.”  Id. at 819, 
203 P.3d at 1218.   
 In this case officers found Saldivar possibly leaving an apartment where there had 
been a “recent shooting.”  (R., pp. 114-15.)  The information officers had was that the gun 
was still at the scene of the shooting.  (Tr., p. 15, Ls. 6-15.)  Given the nature of the potential 
crime, the involvement of a gun that was still at the scene, and Saldivar’s potential 
connection to the potential crime, the gun, and the location, officers were justified in taking 
the reasonable approach of frisking Saldivar. 
 The district court discounted Saldivar’s potential dangerousness by concluding that 
although “[p]roximity to the scene of a dangerous crime does factor into the reasonableness 




 First, the very case cited by the district court (with a “cf.” citation) does not say that 
the nature of the suspected crime is not enough alone to justify a frisk.  The court cited2 
Bishop, 146 Idaho at 819, 203 P.3d at 1218.  In Bishop, however, the Court, after listing 
several factors including whether the encounter was in a high crime area, stated, “Whether 
any of these circumstances, taken together or by themselves, are enough to justify a Terry 
frisk depends on an analysis of the totality of the circumstances.”  Id. at 819, 203 P.3d at 
1218 (emphasis added).  The Bishop opinion simply does not support the district court’s 
holding that “[p]roximity to the scene of a dangerous crime … does not by itself justify a 
frisk.”  (R., p. 118.)  Rather, it stands for the proposition that a single factor may justify a 
frisk.  Moreover, there is a large analytical difference between presence in a “high crime 
area” (R., pp. 118-19 (quoting Bishop, 146 Idaho at 819, 203 P.3d at 1218)), and presence 
at an actual shooting where the gun is still believed to be located. 
 Indeed, the district court’s minimization of the nature of the suspected crime is 
directly contrary to Idaho precedent.  In State v. Burgess, 104 Idaho 559, 661 P.2d 344 (Ct. 
App. 1983), officers responded to a burglar alarm at a tavern and found Burgess walking 
through a parking lot “some twenty feet” from the tavern, stopped him, questioned him, 
and frisked him finding burglary tools.  The court found the stop and frisk reasonable, 
stating: “It is not unreasonable to believe that burglars can be armed and dangerous.”  Id. 
at 561, 661 P.2d at 346.     
 The case of In the Matter of Doe, 145 Idaho 980, 188 P.3d 922 (Ct. App. 2008), 
also involved a suspect stopped for burglary who was found near a church and who 
                                            
2 There is an obvious typo in the court’s citation.  (R., p. 118.)  In context, however, it is 
clear the district court was citing to Bishop, 146 Idaho at 819, 203 P.3d at 1218. 
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generally matched the description of someone reportedly seeking to gain access to the 
building at night.  The court noted that “[s]everal jurisdictions have concluded that certain 
crimes, like burglary, by their very nature are so suggestive of the presence and use of 
weapons that a frisk is always reasonable when officers have reasonable suspicion that an 
individual might be involved in such a crime.”  Id. at 983, 188 P.3d at 925.  The court 
declined to “adopt a bright line rule,” but did acknowledge that “specific circumstances 
combined with certain crimes like burglary make it much more likely that a suspect will be 
armed and dangerous.”  Id. at 983-84, 188 P.3d at 925-26.   Because Doe “could have been 
in possession of burglary tools … that could easily have been used as weapons,” the frisk 
was “justified.”  Id. at 984, 188 P.3d at 926.  See also Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 
74 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring) (“I think that, as in Terry, the right to frisk is automatic 
when an officer lawfully stops a person suspected of a crime whose nature creates a 
substantial likelihood that he is armed”); Henage, 143 Idaho at 663, 152 P.3d at 24 
(Schroeder, J., specially concurring) (“The right to frisk can arise simply from the nature 
of the possible crime the officer is investigating.” (Citing Terry, 392 U.S. 1)). 
 Here there was more than a mere suggestion that the crime at issue may involve a 
weapon.  To the contrary, the officers had every reason to believe that a gun was involved 
in a potentially criminal shooting at the apartment Saldivar was walking away from.  
Officer Schneider testified that he was responding to an apartment where a woman had 
been shot, that “there were other people inside that were intoxicated, and a gun was still 
inside.”  (Tr., p. 15, Ls. 6-15.)  He stopped Saldivar and cuffed and frisked him for officer 
safety reasons because “[t]here was a gun involved” and he wished to be “sure there [were] 
no guns pulled on ourselves or others.”  (Tr., p. 16, Ls. 13-21.)  The district court erred 
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when it concluded that more was required to stop and frisk Saldivar than suspicion that 
Saldivar was leaving a potential shooting scene where the gun was believed to be located. 
 
III. 
The District Court Erred By Requiring An “Additional Line Of Inquiry” Before The 




 Even if the frisk were constitutionally unreasonable, Saldivar’s lawful arrest 
pursuant to an outstanding warrant made the discovery of the gun inevitable, and therefore 
not subject to suppression.  The district court rejected application of the inevitable 
discovery doctrine because the state did not prove “that some additional line of 
investigation would have inevitably resulted in the evidence being discovered.”  (R., p. 122 
(citing State v. Liechty, 152 Idaho 163, 170, 267 P.3d 1278, 1285 (Ct. App. 2011)).  This 
is an incorrect legal standard.  By applying an incorrect legal standard the district court 
erred. 
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
 “When a decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, the Court accepts the trial 
court’s findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but freely reviews the 
application of constitutional principles to the facts as found.”  State v. McNeely, 162 Idaho 
413, 414-15, 398 P.3d 146, 147-48 (2017) (internal quotation omitted).  See also State v. 





C. The District Court Applied An Incorrect Legal Standard To The State’s Claim Of 
Inevitable Discovery 
 
 “The exclusionary rule is the judicial remedy for addressing illegal searches and 
bars the admission or use of evidence gathered pursuant to the illegal search.”  State v. 
Bunting, 142 Idaho 908, 915, 136 P.3d 379, 386 (Ct. App. 2006).  “The United States 
Supreme Court has articulated the three exceptions” to the exclusionary rule, “independent 
origin, inevitable discovery, and attenuated basis.”  Stuart v. State, 136 Idaho 490, 495, 36 
P.3d 1278, 1283 (2001).  The question underlying all three exceptions “is whether, granting 
establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which instant objection is made has 
been come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently 
distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.”  Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 
471, 488 (1963) (internal quotation omitted). 
 The inevitable discovery rule applies in this case.3  The inevitable discovery 
doctrine makes suppression of evidence improper where, even if the evidence was actually 
obtained by constitutionally improper means, the prosecution establishes by a 
                                            
3 The state does not challenge the district court’s ultimate conclusion that the attenuation 
doctrine does not apply.  The state concedes that the discovery of the gun preceded the 
discovery of the outstanding warrant, and therefore there was no intervening circumstance 
that would have attenuated said discovery.  The state disputes the district court’s 
determination that any “misconduct by law enforcement was purposeful and flagrant.”  (R., 
p. 122.)  Although, as stated by the district court, the officer testified that it was “standard 
operating procedure” to frisk “anyone that is put in cuffs” (R., pp. 116, 122), the officer 
testified that he put Saldivar in cuffs (and therefore frisked him) because he was concerned 
for the safety of officers and others because “[t]here was a gun involved.”  (Tr., p. 15, L. 
22 – p. 16, L. 21.)  Officer Schneider did not testify that safety precautions such as cuffing 
and frisking are routinely taken for investigative stops—quite the contrary.  Indeed, a 
policy that officers frisk where they have legitimate concerns for safety that justify 
handcuffing is both constitutional and laudable.  That Officer Schneider took both 




preponderance of proof that the evidence inevitably would have been found by lawful 
means.  Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444 (1984); Stuart, 136 Idaho at 497-98, 36 P.3d 
at 1285-86.  The underlying rationale of this rule is that suppression should leave the 
prosecution in the same position it would have been absent the police misconduct, not a 
worse one.  Nix, 467 U.S. at 442-44; State v. Buterbaugh, 138 Idaho 96, 102, 57 P.3d 807, 
813 (Ct. App. 2002). 
Here Officer Schneider testified that, after identifying Saldivar, police ran a 
warrants check, learned of an outstanding arrest warrant, and arrested Saldivar on that 
arrest warrant.  (Tr., p. 17, Ls. 1-10; R., p. 54.)  The search incident to that arrest would 
have revealed the gun in Saldivar’s pocket had it not been previously removed because of 
the frisk.  (Tr., p. 17, L. 11 – p. 18, L. 19.)  The facts of this case show that the gun would 
have been discovered in a valid search incident to arrest but for it having been previously 
found in the frisk.  Thus, even granting establishment of the primary illegality, the gun 
would inevitably have been discovered by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged 
of the primary taint. 
The district court, citing Liechty, 152 Idaho at 170, 267 P.3d at 1285, concluded 
the state did not prove “that some additional line of investigation would have inevitably 
resulted in the evidence being discovered.”  (R., p. 122.)  However, more recently, in State 
v. Rowland, 158 Idaho 784, 352 P.3d 506 (Ct. App. 2015), the Court of Appeals clarified 
this proposition, stating that the lawful means which would have uncovered the evidence 
“need not be the result of a wholly independent investigation ... they must be the result of 
some action that actually took place (or was in the process of taking place) that would 
inevitably have led to the discovery of the unlawfully obtained evidence.” Id. at 787, 352 
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P.3d at 509. More to the point, the Idaho Supreme Court has stated “the inevitable 
discovery doctrine asks courts to engage in a hypothetical finding into the lawful actions 
law enforcement would have inevitably taken in the absence of the unlawful avenue that 
led to the evidence.”  State v. Downing, 163 Idaho 26, 31, 407 P.3d 1285, 1290 (2017) 
(emphasis original).  Thus, while the inevitable discovery exception does not permit the 
court to speculate on the course of action the investigation could have taken in the absence 
of the constitutional violation, “even if that alternate course likely would have yielded the 
evidence,” it must “presuppose inevitable hypotheticals running in parallel to the illegal 
actions.”  Id. at 32, 407 P.3d at 1291. 
The underlying rationale of the inevitable discovery doctrine is that a 
preponderance of the evidence proves that some action that actually took place, or was in 
the process of taking place, would have led to the discovery of the evidence that was 
already obtained through unlawful police action. See Nix, 467 U.S. at 448-49; Bunting, 
142 Idaho at 916, 136 P.3d at 387.  Because the warrants check, discovery of the warrant, 
and arrest thereon were police actions that in fact took place without regard for the frisk, 
and a search incident to the warranted arrest would have discovered the gun, evidence of 
the gun in Saldivar’s pocket was not suppressible. 
The district court applied an incorrect standard. Application of the correct legal 







 The state respectfully requests this Court to reverse the district court’s order 
suppressing evidence. 
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